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A Realistic Perspective on International Legislation
Abstract. The status of “international law” is examined critically. In the fi rst section, the basis of (national) 
legislation is described. This consists of an inquiry into a credible meaning of “natural law”. It is focused on the 
question whether universal principles exist and, if so, of what kind. Section 2 deals with the issue of enforcement. 
National legislation invariably realizes this, but this is not obvious at the international level. Section 3 deals with 
human rights. It is discussed whether their presence points to the existence of “international law”. To this end, a 
possible reason for these rights to have developed is expounded.
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Introduction
The political developments over the period after World War II have led to a considerable 
number of rules and views at the international level, the complex of which is now recognized 
as “international law”. In this article, the domain as such, rather than a specifi c part of this 
whole, is inquired from a meta-legal perspective. The meaning of “international law” is 
concerned here; how should this be qualifi ed?
In order to ascertain this, a general analysis of the basis of positive law (i.e. the law as 
it is established) is useful. To that end, I will indicate in section 1 how “natural law” may be 
interpreted. The ideas of “natural law” and “international law” are, after all, often connected. 
In section 2, the way in which rules at the international level operate is dealt with; it will be 
shown how these are observed and whether they may be enforced. Finally, in section 3, the 
topic of human rights is discussed, because of its connection with cross-border legal issues. 
The question comes to the fore to what extent human rights are relevant to this subject 
matter.
1. The legal basis at the national level
It is important to determine which elements are constantly (implicitly) present in national 
law. In this way, a possible contrast with the rules at the international level can come to 
light. Because of the general theme of this article, I cannot treat any possible perspective on 
natural law; I will merely deal with the most important positions for the present discussion.
I mention the term “natural law”; the approaches of two philosophers in particular, 
Herbert Hart and Thomas Hobbes, are clarifying with regard to this matter. A familiar 
interpretation of “natural law” is the “classical” approach; it consists of a standard indicating 
that a natural law exists in an absolute, immutable sense and should (morally) be 
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acknowledged as the directive for actual legislation,1 the truth or rectitude being the same 
for all and equally known to all insofar as the collective principles of reason are involved.2
It may accordingly be said that “every posited human law contains the rationale of the 
law to the degree in which it is derived from the law of nature. If it, however, in any way, 
discords with the natural law, it will no longer be a law, but a corruption of law.”3 The right 
to a fair trial, e.g. could in this perspective be taken to exist before it is laid down by a 
(human) legislator.
This perspective differs from Hart’s. He argues that any social organization must 
contain a “[…] minimum content of Natural Law […]”,4 consisting of “[…] universally 
recognized principles of conduct which have a basis in elementary truths concerning human 
beings, their natural environment, and aims […].”5
This means that basic rules (according to Hart even “truisms”) have to be present in 
order for human coexistence to be possible. There has to be “approximate equality”, for 
example: people must be approximately equally strong, since some exceptionally powerful 
individual might easily dominate the others, without observing the law.6 “Natural law” is 
clearly given a different meaning from the usual one mentioned above; Hart connects this 
with the laws of nature, such as the law of gravity.7
The second philosopher who should be mentioned here is Hobbes. For him, “natural 
law” means no more or less than the way in which one acts, on the basis of reason.8 In this 
sense, there are natural laws, such as the most important one that one should attempt to live 
together peacefully with others as far as possible, and can resort to war if this should turn 
out to be unattainable.9 Hence, there is a signifi cant agreement between Hobbes’s viewpoint 
and Hart’s.
Although Hart’s minimum content of natural law regards circumstances which apply 
independently of agents whereas Hobbes focuses on reason and, consequently, the agent, 
both make it clear that actual circumstances are the issue. Natural law is transposed into 
positive law; the contents are even alike: “The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain 
each other, and are of equall extent. For the Lawes of Nature […] are not properly Lawes, 
1 Aquinas, Th.: Summa Theologiae. [1274]. Complete Works, vol. 7: 1a2ae Summae Theologiae 
a quaestione 71 ad quaestionem 114. Rome, 1892. 1a2ae, q. 90, art. 2 (p. 150); q. 93, art. 3 (p. 164); q. 
94, art. 2 (pp. 169, 170); q. 94, art. 5 (pp. 172, 173).
2 Ibid. 1a2ae, q. 94, art. 4 (p. 171).
3 “[…] omnis lex humantitus posita intantum habet de ratione legis, inquantum a lege naturae 
derivatur. Si vero in aliquo a lege naturali discordet, iam non erit lex, sed legis corruptio.” Ibid. 1a2ae, 
q. 95, art. 2 (p. 175).
4 Hart, H. L. A.: The Concept of Law. Oxford, 1961, 189.
5 Ibid. 189.
6 Ibid. 190, 191.
7 Ibid. 184.
8 The (subjective) “right of nature” is not specifi ed (as, e.g. the right to life) as Hobbes defi nes 
the liberty that is part of this right negatively as “the absence of externall Impediments” [Leviathan, 
91 (Chapter 14); cf. 145 (Chapter 21)].
9 Hobbes, Th.: Leviathan [1651]. Ed. by R. Tuck. Cambridge, 2007. 91, 92 (Chapter 14). His 
premise in this respect is similar to Hart’s when he emphasizes the (approximate) equality between 
people [Hobbes: Leviathan. op. cit. 86, 87 (Chapter 13)].
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but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience. When a Common-wealth is once 
settled, then are they actually Lawes, and not before […].”10
Both thinkers provide an important contribution to determining the basic elements in 
law. If someone should, e.g. be capable to subject all others to himself, it may be argued 
that the existence of legislation would be irrelevant to him. After all, it would not be in his 
interest to submit to rules which impede him.
Is this approach to natural law the most credible one? As I said, the treatment of this 
topic must be summary, but it is in order to pay some attention to an alternative. This 
consists in positive law being ideally modelled after “classical” natural law, or natural law 
in the narrow sense, as it may be called. This alternative is adhered to by many, amongst 
whom Hugo Grotius is an important exponent. He argues that natural law follows from 
human nature,11 but specifi es this differently than (for example) Hobbes, by indicating that 
it is inherent to natural law to keep one’s promises12 and that people would also have sought 
out each other if a mutual dependence weren’t the case.13 It is important that not merely 
reason is involved here, but “right reason”.14
It is diffi cult to make it clear how natural law would compel in this case, as Hobbes 
observes15–who doesn’t, incidentally, oppose Grotius but Aristotle, who exhibits a similar 
account of human nature16 (people can, in Hobbes’s view, only live together fi rmly if the 
state of nature is abolished and a sovereign is present17), and, so, a specifi c part of the latter’s 
political philosophy. In section 2, this topic, the enforceability of law, will receive attention.
As for the question whether this opinion is tenable, it is diffi cult to ascertain how the 
existence of natural law in the narrow sense may be maintained. Natural law in Hart’s and 
Hobbes’s sense can be defended empirically, but the alternative’s claims exceed the means 
of its proponents to justify them. It is at least possible to describe a system of law without 
involving this sort of natural law. Even if this isn’t criticized on its contents, an important 
criticism can thus be exercised18 of positions that argue its existence. It cannot be refuted, 
but its presence can be shown to be redundant.
10 Ibid. 185 (Chapter 26).
11 Grotius, H.: De Iure Belli ac Pacis. [1625] (On the right of war and peace). Aalen, 1993, 9 
(Prolegomena, § 8). 
12 Ibid. 11 (Prolegomena, § 15). Hobbes also promulgates this [Leviathan. 100 (Chapter 15)], 
but not in the same way as Grotius, namely on the basis of a “social appetite” [Grotius: De Iure Belli 
ac Pacis. 8 (Prolegomena, § 7)]–since without a sovereign to preserve the peace, people don’t (stably) 
unite [Leviathan.  88 (Chapter 13)]–but on the basis of self-interest [e.g. Leviathan, 93 (Chapter 14)].
13 Grotius: De Iure Belli ac Pacis. op. cit. 12 (Prolegomena, § 16).
14 “Natural law is the dictate of right reason.” (“Ius naturale est dictatum rectae rationis […].”) 
(Grotius: De Iure Belli ac Pacis. op. cit. 34 [Book 1, Chapter 1, § 10]). The phrase “right reason” is 
also used by Hobbes (Leviathan, 32 (Chapter 5), for whom the notion lacks the moral connotation it 
has with Grotius.
15 Hobbes: Leviathan. op. cit. 471 (Chapter 46).
16 Aristotle: Politica. [± 350 BCE]. Opera, vol. 2. Ed. by I. Bekker. Darmstadt, 1960. 1253a.
17 Hobbes: Leviathan. op. cit. 88 (Chapter 13) (cf. supra, note 12).
18 By means of the approach known as Occam’s razor, after an interpretation of part of William 
of Occam’s epistemology [de Ockham, G.: Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum Ordinatio [± 
1319]: Distinctiones 19–48. Opera Philosophica et Theologica: Opera Theologica, vol. 4. Ed. by G. 
Etzkorn and F. Kelley. St. Bonaventure University, (NY) 1979, Distinctio 30, Quaestio 1 (p. 317), 
Quaestio 2 (p. 322); cf. Distinctio 27, Quaestio 2 (p. 202)].
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The situation Hart and Hobbes describe is a valuable starting-point to qualify the 
national domain. The question arises whether this applies to the international domain as 
well. With respect to the “approximate equality”, e.g. it is obvious that this is not found 
between states. In section 2, the consequences of this state of affairs are expounded.
2. Enforceability as a necessary element in a system of law
In the previous section, some problems with natural law in the narrow sense were pointed 
out. Accordingly, it does not seem to provide a viable basis to argue the existence of 
“international law”. In this section, the issue is approached from a different perspective, by 
inquiring into the relevance of enforceability. I will start again with the analysis at the 
national level; this time, the contrast with “international law” will receive more attention 
than it did in the fi rst section.
It is characteristic, among other things, for national legislation that it can be enforced. 
To provide an example at that level: art. 310 of the Dutch Penal Code, which makes theft 
punishable, has no value if a perpetrator of this felony cannot be tried before a court of law. 
How is this settled internationally? If one wants to summon a state before the International 
Court of Justice, this state must itself have recognized the jurisdiction of the Court (art. 36, 
section 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice). The same rule applies to a 
situation in which parties appear before the International Criminal Court (art. 12, section 2 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court).
The International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court lack, in this 
way, the unconditional authority of national courts of law, whose decisions can actually be 
executed, irrespective of the will of the parties involved (cf., e.g. art. 553 of the Dutch 
Criminal Proceedings Act for the Dutch situation). A sovereign at the international level is 
lacking, the consequences of which are evident: there is no instance to which parties have 
transferred their competences and the judge, accordingly, merely rules in the cases that are 
willingly submitted to his discretion. One may wonder whether this state of affairs may be 
deemed a practice of law.
In this case, of course, it is not the (supposed) basic contract on the basis of which, in 
Hobbes’s model, the contracting parties appoint a sovereign19 which is involved but the fact 
that rules must be enforceable. Hart distinguishes between primary and secondary rules; the 
fi rst sort of rules indicate what one must do or is forbidden to do, while rules of the second 
sort determine, besides the coming about and changing of the primary rules, in the form of 
“rules of adjudication”, that judges are given the power to judge.20 This has no merit without 
the additional possibility of imposing sanctions.
Hart resists the idea that the sovereign is above the law.21 In his model, moreover, the 
position of a sovereign is not a central issue, because of the following: “There are […] two 
minimum conditions necessary and suffi cient for the existence of a legal system. On the 
one hand those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system’s ultimate criteria 
of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition 
19 Hobbes: Leviathan. op. cit. 120 (Chapter 17).
20 Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 94.
21 Ibid. 218.
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specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be 
effectively accepted as common public standards of offi cial behaviour by its offi cials.”22
If these conditions are indeed met, a sovereign may not be required (although it should 
still be possible to sanction a transgression of the rules). At the international level, this 
situation doesn’t apply, as appears from the behavior of some (powerful) states. There, the 
lack of a sovereign is severe: there is license. It turns out that there is only a conditional 
relation at this level: parties agree on something and accept that a judge may render a 
verdict.
The fact that there is a judge seems nonetheless to imply the presence of law. Still, 
how should this be appraised? The following from the Charter of the United Nations is 
illustrative: “If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under 
a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council 
[…].” (art. 94, section 2 of the UN Charter). Since the permanent members have the right of 
veto (art. 27, section 3 of the UN Charter), in a number of cases there will be no legal 
enforcement.23
This also applies to possible sanctions imposed by the Security Council: members of 
the United Nations “[…] may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of 
membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” 
(art. 5 of the UN Charter) and “[…] may be expelled from the Organization by the General 
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” if they haven’t acted in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter (art. 6 of the UN Charter). Those who are 
permanent members may prevent sanctions issued against them. This already points to an 
important given: some states being more powerful than others, which is, as described in the 
previous section, not a decisive factor at the national level, impedes the enforcement of 
decisions or renders these impossible.24 It is not without reason that countries such as Japan 
attempt to acquire permanent membership, while it would at the moment probably be 
unrealistic to expect countries such as Belgium, Finland and Estonia to fulfi ll this role.
The status of the member states appears to be decisive for the position they occupy. 
Similar issues may present themselves at the national level, but in those cases they are 
excesses. If a national court of law punished a successful businessman differently than a 
beggar (ceteris paribus), this would be considered unacceptable. At the international level, 
by contrast, the perspective that one state is more powerful than another is not only 
accepted, but evidently one of the (established) principles.
As for disputes about judgments by the International Criminal Court: these are, insofar 
as they don’t concern the judicial functions of the Court, if states cannot come to an 
understanding amongst themselves, referred to the International Court of Justice (art. 119, 
section 2 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court), so that the problem just 
observed occurs here as well.
This is also apparent at the European level. If a Member State doesn’t adhere to an 
obligation which is incumbent on it on the basis of the Consolidated version of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission may, having summoned the 
Member State to take the appropriate measures, bring the case before the Court of Justice 
(art. 258 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
22 Ibid. 113.
23 Hart considers this to be an important objection (The Concept of Law. op. cit. 227).
24 Cf. Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 191, 214.
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Union). If the Court rules in favour of the Commission, the Member State in question is to 
take the necessary measures to comply with the Court’s judgment (art. 260, fi rst section of 
the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).
This is still a straightforward practice. Should the Member State, however, subsequently 
fail to comply with the Court’s judgment, nor pay the “lump sum or penalty payment” the 
Court can impose on it (art. 260, second section of the Consolidated version of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union), there are no further legal means to induce the 
Member State. There are, of course, political ways through which to maneuver, but these 
already exist, irrespective of the rules, so that an appeal to them doesn’t enhance the status 
of European legislation. The provisions in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union directed at the Member States may be invoked by 
individuals before a national court of law, but this shifts the crucial element to a nation, so 
that, via a detour, national law is concerned: European legislation is there accepted and 
applied.
It is not just the position of the judge that is illustrative for the dubious position of 
international legislation. An organ of the executive of the United Nations, the Security 
Council (mentioned above), appears not to be able to operate on its own. This is clear from 
the fact that fi ve of the fi fteen members had to be given the status of permanent member 
(art. 23, section 1 of the UN Charter) (which, moreover, as was remarked above, acquired 
the veto right), apparently because they would not have adhered to decisions that contravene 
their interests. This pragmatic solution is commendable, but in this way politics are decisive 
and there seems to be no room for a (separate) domain of law.
It is, then, diffi cult to demonstrate that international law exists. Agreements have been 
made, but it cannot consistently be inferred from the behavior of states that they 
acknowledge these as legal. Problems don’t often ensue since issues are involved in which 
it is to states’ advantage that the agreements are met, or since one wants to prevent political 
diffi culties to arise,25 but that doesn’t indicate a recognition of international rules as law.
Hegel points to the problems at the international level as a result of a lack of 
enforceability: “There is no magistrate; there are at best arbitrators and mediators between 
states, and these merely coincidentally, i.e. according to specifi c wishes.”26 Although many 
supranational organizations have been erected, this observation still seems to be correct. In 
Hegel’s view, there can only be a command (“Sollen”) to obey the rules;27 the problems 
might be resolved through moral standards.28 For Hegel, moreover, positive law and natural 
law coincide.29
25 The latter situation may account for behavior which seems to be at odds with the thesis that 
international law is observed by states if this seems to confl ict with their interests [Scott, S. V.: 
International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and 
International Politics. European Journal of International Law, 5 (1994) 1, 314.]
26 “Es giebt keinen Prätor, höchstens Schiedsrichter und Vermittler zwischen Staaten, und auch 
diese nur zufälligerweise, d.i. nach besondern Willen.” Hegel, G. W. F.: Grundlinien der Philosophie 
des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse [1821]. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 
1964, § 333, Anmerkung (p. 443).
27 Ibid. § 333 (p. 443).
28 Such a way out doesn’t suffi ce, in my opinion, but I won’t elaborate on that here.
29 There is, in Hegel’s perspective, only positive law [Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 
§ 3 (p. 42)], but this merely follows from the fact that there is no difference between positive law and 
natural law [Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 3, Anmerkung (pp. 42, 43)].
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Similar characteristics pertain to the current situation: “A clear weakness of 
international law […] is that the enforcement mechanisms of international law continue to 
be unsatisfactory and the Security Council does not offer an adequate substitute.”30 This is 
not all there is to say on this issue; international law may originate in the same manner as 
national law. Once international law is realized, it is abided by because the enforceability is 
a given. Accordingly, it is not in the nature of international law that it could not exist; it 
would be more apt to say that it must follow the same course as national law in order to 
function. Franck rightly points out that incidental noncompliance is not decisive; even at 
the national level, this is manifested;31 a crucial difference, however, is that actors at the 
national level that do not observe the law can be punished against their will.32
It may be objected that in the preceding no defi nition was given of “law” or of “right”. 
This is not only diffi cult but perhaps even impossible. To this predicament one may add that 
“[…] there is no such thing as an intrinsically ‘proper’ or ‘improper’ meaning of a word.”,33 
and that “[…] the idea of a true defi nition is a superstition”,34 so that the matter whether 
“international law” is law is merely verbal35 and needs to be abjured36 (no pun intended). 
These observations have merit. A defi nition is in many cases an inadequate tool in setting 
up an argumentation, viz., if one coins a defi nition and subsequently inquires what follows 
from it. Various lines of thought may thus arise that are not mutually compatible or 
consistent; they may even confl ict. Alternatively, a defi nition may be used (in common) if it 
is justifi ed, such as that of a triangle.
The question is, then, which of these two situations (one starts with a defi nition and 
constructs a line of thought on this basis, or uses a defi nition justifi edly) applies. In my 
opinion, it is the second, so that Williams’s remarks are enervated, at least with regard to 
this issue. To illustrate this, I point to the way the word “law” is used. If someone were to 
say that the Corpus Iuris Civilis is law at present, he would have a hard time explaining 
why, whereas it would be easy to argue that (part of) it was law during the 6th century 
A.D.37
This approach does not entirely entail that “international law” is not law, of course: 
there are people who use the word “law” to refer to “international law” (indeed, otherwise 
30 Carty, A.: Philosophy of International Law. Edinburgh, 2007. 81.
31 Franck, Th. M.: The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in 
an Age of Power Disequilibrium. American Journal of International Law, 100 (2006) 1, 91; cf. 
D’Amato, A.: International Law: Process and Prospect. 9. Irvington (NY), 1995. 
32 As Hobbes puts it: “[…] if any man had so farre exceeded the rest in power, that all of them 
with joyned forces could not have resisted him, there had been no cause why he should part with that 
Right which nature had given him […].” Hobbes, Th.: De Cive [1651] (the English version), entitled 
in the fi rst edition Philosophicall Rudiments Concerning Government and Society. Ed. by H. 
Warrender. Oxford, 1983, Chapter 15, § 5 (p. 186).
33 Williams, G. L.: International Law and the Controversy concerning the Word “Law”. British 
Yearbook of International Law, 22 (1945), 148. 
34 Ibid. 159.
35 Ibid. 157.
36 Ibid. 163.
37 The legislation was initially limited to the Eastern Roman Empire; upon the recapture of the 
provinces of the Western Roman Empire that had fallen to the Ostrogoths, it was introduced there as 
well. The restored unity did not last, however, as the empire was invaded by the Lombards in 568 
A.D. It is doubtful whether the legislation was predominant even before 568 A.D., inter alia since it 
did not compose a systematic whole.
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the present article would largely be moot). This usage appears to result from an unwarranted 
expansion of the domain to which “law” may be said to refer. One easily introduces the 
political process to the discussion when referring to the international domain, thus 
confounding politics and law: “[…] assurances for securing compliance with [customs, 
principles, and norms that function as rules to regulate conduct by persons in their mutual 
relations as members of a political community] need not be predicated on the assertion of 
force or the promise of swift, certain punishment of wrongdoers. In the international 
dimension, guarantees of law for regulating states remain primarily couched in international 
public opinion and the political will of governments to make the law work in their national 
interest.”38 If such a position is opted for, the discussion comes to an end prematurely, since 
“international law” is then supposed to include international politics, which evidently do 
exist.
In any event, it seems to be clear that the obligations that the law imposes need to be 
enforceable; its lack of permissiveness is characteristic for the law. D’Amato presents an 
admirably nuanced view in dealing with the matter with regard to the international level, 
but his interpretation of “enforcement” seems too broad; pointing out that not all 
punishments are physical (e.g. a monetary fi ne), it is concluded that “[…] when we think of 
legal enforcement, we need not imagine the use of physical force against the person of the 
law violator, although, of course, in some cases physical force is appropriate.”39 Yet 
(physical) force is invariably needed if the initial punishment is not effective (if a monetary 
fi ne is not paid, enforcement will still be necessary). So even if force is not always 
immediately required, its presence in the form of a back-up is needed.
Does this mean that the state of nature, for the time being at least, continues to exist 
between states? Hobbes affi rms this.40 This doesn’t entail, according to his line of thought, 
that actual battle need arise, for he distinguishes between war and battle: “[…] WARRE, 
consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fi ghting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will 
to contend by Battell is suffi ciently known […].”41
The objection that the differences between states are greater than those between 
individuals, which is sometimes offered as evidence that Hobbes’s depiction of the state of 
nature doesn’t apply to the international level,42 is not decisive as various reasons may exist 
why countries don’t attack other countries, e.g. because of the danger that they will, in turn, 
be attacked themselves by countries that have a special interest in retaliatory measures, or 
because they value the economic interests that can be satisfi ed peacefully more than the 
gains that may result from an act of aggression.
Here, Grotius’s position is no realistic alternative, either. He, too, emphasizes the role 
of enforcement: it is the law that enforces.43 The power to sanction fl ows, in his opinion, 
from natural law itself;44 sovereigns impose sanctions, but this is rather a result of natural 
law than of their positions as rulers;45 natural law itself lacks force, but is still effective 
38 Joyner, C. C.: International Law in the 21st century. Lanham (MD), 2005. 5, 6. 
39 D’Amato, A.: International Law: Process and Prospect. op. cit. 14, 15.
40 Hobbes: Leviathan. op. cit. 90 (Chapter 13); 163 (Chapter 22).
41 Ibid. 88 (Chapter 13).
42 Yurdusev, A. N.: Thomas Hobbes and International Relations: From Realism to Rationalism. 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60 (1996) 2, 316.
43 Grotius: De Iure Belli ac Pacis. op. cit. 34 (Book 1, Chapter 1, § 9).
44 Ibid. 511 (Book 2, Chapter 20, § 40).
45 Ibid. 509 (Book 2, Chapter 20, § 40).
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(“Neque […] quamvis a vi destitutum ius omni caret effectu.”).46 Natural law would then, 
in the absence of an authority to take action, have to “force”, which is diffi cult to make 
insightful without an appeal to a (presupposed) human nature (cf. supra, note 11).
Hart points out that the law can’t be reduced to “[…] general orders backed by threats 
given by one generally obeyed […]”,47 but the enforceability which, as was indicated, is 
characteristic for the national level is a necessary condition to distinguish between rules of 
law and requests or commandments48 as long as the law has not been internalized by the 
subjects of law (or rather prospective subjects of law). Hart does not want to infer that 
international law doesn’t exist from the fact that there is no enforceability at the international 
level,49 but he doesn’t make it clear what this would mean. A reference to the fact that states 
actually keep to the rules is not suffi cient here, since they do this on the basis of self-
interest.
In this regard, one may argue that states, acting only if gains are to be expected,50 are 
not bound in the same way individuals are at the national level. The conclusion that “[t]here 
is no easy or clear way to distinguish international law from either politics or mere norms.”51 
seems justifi ed, with the caveat that this implies the conceptual existence of separate 
domains of “international law” and “norms”. The diffi culty of the former I have attempted 
to expound above; the problems with the latter requires a treatment that would lead to too 
great a digression. Still, in the last section a relevant issue will be discussed that borders on 
this.
3. The import of human rights
In the foregoing, it was shown that it is diffi cult demonstrate the existence of international 
law owing to a lack of enforceability at the international level. Yet the existence of universal 
human rights seems to point to international law. Many treaties have been signed to protect 
human rights, among which the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Should 
the presence of international law, even if one grants the enforceability issue, not be 
concluded on this given?
Those who contend that international law has been settled in these documents seem to 
overlook an important factor. They are indeed universal treaties, in that they focus on the 
rights of human beings around the entire world. On the other hand, the universality is 
obviously limited: they are universal treaties on human rights. There are principles which 
transcend the systems of law of countries, such as the principle that a punishable fact should 
be legally laid down, which is established in both national legislation and in international 
treaties, e.g. in art. 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
46 Ibid. 13 (Prolegomena, § 20).
47 Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 24.
48 Apart from the Ten Commandments, which are not supposed to be without consequences if 
not obeyed.
49 Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 215.
50 Cf. Guzman, A. T.: How International Law Works. A Rational Choice Theory. Oxford, 2008. 
121, 180.
51 Ibid. 217.
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Does this imply the presence of an international domain of principles, to be codifi ed by 
legislators, or is there another basis of law than the universal human rights?
In virtually every society there seems to be a basic set of standards (cf. section 1). One 
may even call this into question.52 (I won’t deal with the opinions of those who argue a 
fundamental relativism in this respect. This can’t be refuted a priori, but is more radical 
than what I put forward here. If such a position is accepted, it will only have even more 
extensive consequences for the appraisal of law.)
There seem to be (or to have been) primitive societies where certain fundamental 
norms are (or were) not maintained, but what is the relevance of this? It is unclear whether 
one may really call this a society. This depends on the scope of one’s defi nition of “society”. 
To what extent does a bond justify utilizing the idea of society? If one merely associates at 
times of mutual dependence, an atomic whole (one does not consider oneself, or at least not 
primarily, to be a part of a greater whole) remains the background for each relation.
At any rate, the fact that societies acknowledge basic standards independently of each 
other is no proof for the existence of natural law in the narrow sense. One can point to–
besides the minimum content of natural law (Hart; cf. supra, note 4) or the laws of nature 
(Hobbes; cf. supra, note 7), in which the domain for positive law to have a breeding ground 
at all is made explicit (cf. section 1)–a number of values, such as the right to life (art. 6 of 
the ICCPR) and a fair trial (art. 14 of the ICCPR), which are indeed necessary conditions. If 
one should, e.g. not deem one’s life protected properly by (the enforcers of) the law, anarchy 
might be imminent. From this it may be concluded that the basic rights and laws which 
appear in each system of law owe their existence to their being required for a system of law 
to be possible at all.
This can be illustrated by a (global) description of the development of the rights of 
individuals. Those who could exert the greatest power in society could, once rights had 
been established, determine which rights would be concerned and to whom they would be 
allotted. It may be argued that gender and race were pivotal factors in this development, 
which is clear from, e.g. the respective moments women received suffrage in Europe and 
the U.S.A. and the subordinate position of minorities in various places.
At some time (various moments) the rights of women and minorities were 
acknowledged. One may wonder whether universal principles were then transmitted into 
positive law. This would mean that it was recognized that these groups of people should not 
be disfavoured, which is diffi cult to uphold. It seems more likely that the position of these 
groups could no longer be ignored as they gained power, partly because of their ability to 
unite. To deny them their rights would undermine the system of law.
This is, of course, not the only possibility to explain the rise of these rights. One may, 
alternatively, appeal to human life as being “of intrinsic importance”53 or it may be advanced 
that in some cases reason was acknowledged as a criterion. As to the fi rst possibility: it will 
be diffi cult, if not impossible, to make it clear what this means,54 and, apart from that, why, 
even if it is acknowledged to be correct, it does not extend to other beings than human 
52 Cf. Winch, P.: Ethics and Action. London, 1972. 57; Winch himself doesn’t deny, incidentally, 
that a pattern can be discerned (Ethics and Action. 58).
53 Dworkin, R.: Is Democracy Possible Here? Princeton (NJ)–Oxford, 2006. 35.
54 Dworkin does not, in any case, succeed in doing this, appealing merely to a principle (the 
“principle of intrinsic value”) that “almost all of us” are said to share (Ibid. 9). This does not seem to 
be more than an appeal to common sense, which cannot, in my opinion, serve as a basis.
143A REALISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
beings. In the second case (an appeal to reason), one may grant reason as the criterion, but 
maintain that this is only the case because certain rights could no longer be withheld. If a 
being apparently endowed with reason were not granted the basic rights, the grounds for the 
rights of those already in possession of them would come under discussion. Reason would 
no longer serve as a standard and would have to be replaced by another one. This is, 
however, lacking, which is why this issue was brought up in the fi rst place. It is reasonable 
beings who maintain reason as a criterion,55 since this is an element shared by them (and 
through which they can distinguish themselves in relevant aspects from other beings), a 
factor that continually serves as a minimum condition in order to claim a particular right. In 
this case it is important to discern being able to use one’s reason in establishing rights on 
the one hand and acknowledging reason as a criterion for attributing certain rights on the 
other. That this distinction is not always made doesn’t detract from its merit.
It is decisive that reasonable creatures are the ones formulating the rights and norms. 
They separate a specifi c domain for themselves and those like them, where more rights can 
be appealed to than elsewhere. Only they, by the way, are of course able to accomplish this. 
Animals (apparently) not only lack the intelligence to reach the level of abstraction required 
to draft laws, but are even unable to realize the systematic organization that serves as a 
prerequisite for a forum to produce laws. As far as they are concerned, it seems, there is 
merely a community. This may be quite large, as seems to be the case in a number of 
species of bees. There is no need, then, to realize legislation: the mutual competition which 
is characteristic for humans is absent, for one reason because these creatures don’t (or even 
can’t) observe a difference between private and public interests.56
At any rate, what is at stake is not that it is acknowledged that the rights of reasonable 
beings ought to be respected, in accordance with natural law in the narrow sense, but that a 
minimum domain can be isolated, where one is safe; the beings that don’t have access to 
this domain can’t appeal to these rights. In this way, one may, if one, moreover, in fact also 
acts on this basis (and doesn’t oneself act from the conviction that natural law in the narrow 
sense applies, which is also possible, though I would not, as said, concur with this view), 
withhold basic rights to beings deemed not to dispose of reason.
The diffi cult matter what reason is and which beings may be said to dispose of it is not 
explicated here; this is not necessary as only the factual situation is considered (i.e. what 
“reason” has been taken–roughly–to be), although what it has been thought to be may have 
been prompted (perhaps indeliberately) by a desire to fi nd a distinguishing feature. The 
need for a specifi c domain mentioned above would in that case have an even more 
fundamental precursor here.
Animal rights have been laid down in legislation rudimentarily.57 Fundamental rights 
are in some places recognized–the German Constitution contains these, for instance (in art. 
20a)–but in these cases only very general rights are concerned. Many rights are irrelevant to 
animals, such as the freedom of expression. The most important ones, such as the right to 
55 Schopenhauer already points to this (Schopenhauer, A.: Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik 
[1840]. Sämtliche Werke, Band 4. Wiesbaden, 1950. 162).
56 Cf. Hobbes: Leviathan. op. cit. 119–120 (Chapter 17).
57 If one opines, perhaps on the basis of an account similar to the one described above, the 
criterion whether a being can suffer, which Jeremy Bentham famously advances as the pivotal issue 
[An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]. The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 
vol. 1. Ed. by J. Bowring. New York (NY), 1962. 143 (note)], decisive, animals’ suffering is to be 
avoided, at least to some degree.
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life, however, are of importance. Perhaps some animal rights will eventually be established 
structurally.
An ever greater number of rights may in this way be laid down, so that the domain of 
subjects of law gradually expands from white men to human beings to sentient beings. It 
cannot be inferred from this that universal principles would function as a driving force as it 
is unclear how the process in which an increasing number of rights are acknowledged 
develops and why. If the way in which an insight into this process is possible is not clear, 
only the actual development can be observed.
The same consideration as the one mentioned in section 1 is relevant here. It was 
argued there that the absence of natural law in the narrow sense cannot be demonstrated, 
which did not prove to be a decisive objection. The present section adds that it can’t be 
proved that universal principles exist. Of course, this is not the challenge; on the contrary, it 
is up to those who maintain natural law in the narrow sense to demonstrate to what extent 
these would exist. Accordingly, the issue revolves around the question whether it is more 
credible for such principles to serve as a basis in establishing human rights, or whether 
these should rather be considered to be generalizations made in hindsight; a top-down- 
versus a bottom-up-approach. I have indicated above that the second approach seems to me 
to be the more persuasive.
What does this entail for the matter whether international principles are decisive for 
law? Rules at the international level are no indication for the existence of natural law in the 
narrow sense. In international relations, one does not suppose that certain principles of 
natural law in the narrow sense should be transposed into positive law. If this plays any 
role, it merely points to a possible justifi cation of natural law in the narrow sense, but if it 
doesn’t play any role, the debate is concluded even sooner.
Conclusion
In this article, I have outlined a number of aspects of the domain referred to as “international 
law” and on that basis problematized the idea that “international law” exists. In the fi rst 
section, it was indicated which are the minimal conditions for a system of law to be 
considered as such. I pointed out the characteristics that can be found in any system of law. 
Especially the fact that none of the subjects of law is able to ignore the rules is important.
In section 2 this was elaborated upon; it was also described what this means at the 
international level. It turned out that hard questions issue from the fact that a great number 
of rules can’t be enforced at that level. If a state can simply ignore certain rules, it is diffi cult 
to maintain that there is law, particularly if this situation is compared with the one at the 
national level, where a relatively clear process of law can be discerned.
Human rights, fi nally, which were discussed in section 3, exhibit international patterns. 
It doesn’t follow from this, however, that international principles are concerned. It is more 
credible to argue that one is motivated by one’s own needs; people appear to want to 
optimize their position and can only realize this (seemingly) credibly by respecting the 
rights they want to have bestowed upon themselves of others as well.
This article’s purport is primarily academic: problems at the international level are 
often–pragmatically–resolved by means to which many parties can assent. That this is 
nevertheless not a merely theoretical issue is clear from the fact that those solutions are 
invariably of a political nature. If a relatively powerful state acknowledges the authority of 
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the International Court of Justice, e.g. it does so because this renders more favourable 
results (economically or politically) than the alternative of not acknowledging its authority.
In order to resolve this state of affairs, conglomerates were formed, such as Europe, 
but this doesn’t produce a consistent solution and leads to ad hoc-approaches. This 
situation–international politics are decisive instead of alleged ‘international law’–will 
remain until a supranational system of law emerges modeled after those in developed 
countries. Whether this will in fact appear is diffi cult to predict.
